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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Warren L. Mengis*
In preparing an article for the annual faculty symposium, the writer
usually looks back over the past year for significant legislative acts and
judicial decisions. Primarily, we are trying to bring to the attention of
the practicing bar the developments which have occurred. Last year's
article' is illustrative.
A review of all of the Louisiana cases touching on the Legal Pro-
fession since last year's article revealed nothing new, with the possible
exception of L.S.B.A. v. Chatelain.2 There. were the usual number of
discipline cases, perhaps even a few more than usual, and the usual
number of malpractice cases. There were several "reasonable fee" cases
and five or six "effective assistance of counsel" decisions.
On the legislative side, however, there was an extremely important
development. "Rule eleven" was made a part of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure in article 863 and article 1420. In addition, local
bar associations around the country were adopting "lawyer creeds" and
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed her dismay at unlimited legal
advertising.
No matter what a lawyer picks up to read these days he finds
someone in authority exhorting "professionalism." Mr. Wood Brown,
III, president of the Louisiana State Bar Association, characterizes this
subject as one of the "hot items" among the organized bar nationwide.3
He refers to a dissenting opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association4 in which she outlines several of
the elements of what constitutes a "learned profession." Justice O'Con-
nor was writing in opposition to unrestricted lawyer advertising.'
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In the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, the court en banc has established standards
designed to govern the conduct of attorneys engaged in civil litigation. 6
These standards stress the lawyer's duty to the judicial system (the
obligation of candor, diligence, and respect to the judiciary), as well as
his obligation of courtesy and cooperation toward opposing counsel. 7
In the same locality the Dallas Bar Association has recently adopted
"guidelines of professional courtesy" and a "lawyer's creed," both of
which stress the lawyer's obligation to use the judicial system properly
and responsibly."
Most of us .are familiar with the report of the Commission on
Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association that was released in August of 1986. 9
We see the same thing stressed in this report as in all of the other
literature on professional responsibility: a lawyer true to his profession
realizes that he has awesome privileges and responsibilities in what we
call the "system of justice." Michael Davis, writing in the Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics, 0 defined "professionalism" as putting your
profession first. He continued:
To declare yourself a lawyer is to profess more than knowledge
or experience of legal work. It is, in effect, to claim that you
have the education lawyers are supposed to have, passed the
tests lawyers are supposed to pass, that you have made the
commitments lawyers are supposed to make. Among those com-
mitments is the commitment to act in accordance with a code
of ethics, such as, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, or some similar
code (depending on where the lawyer practices)."
One of the elements that is always included in any definition of
"professionalism" is self-regulation. This is accomplished in Louisiana
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which became effective
on January 1, 1987. Those rules emphasize, more than did the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the lawyer's duties toward the system of
justice and nonclients, or third parties. Complementing these rules are
6. These standards were set out in Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings
and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
7. Id. at 287.
8. Id.
9. ". . . in the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
10. Davis, Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First, 2 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 341 (1988).
11. Id. at 342.
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several recent amendments to articles 863 and 1420 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure.'2 These amendments introduce a sort of "rule
eleven" into Louisiana's civil procedure.' 3
At this point it would seem pertinent to stop and ask ourselves if
all of this emphasis on professionalism is working. In conjunction with
mandatory continuing legal education, this writer speaks on ethics
throughout the state of Louisiana. Anecdotal evidence from both lawyers
and judges indicates that the answer must be a resounding no. But why?
Surely there must be more than one reason. Would lawyers and the
public be better off with no self-regulation? Are we truly, as Mr. Michael
Garth Moore wrote to the National Law Journal in 1987, members of
"a trade, like the plumber, the carpenter and the cabinetmaker," and
therefore not susceptible to self-regulation?
It appears to this writer that the necessity perceived by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the Dallas Bar
Association, the Legislature of Louisiana and the Congress of the United
States to supplement the positive expressions of the lawyer's ethical
duties is in fact a recognition that the current system is not working.
Is BETTER SELF-REGULATION THE ANSWER?
It has long been a tenet of a national consumer organization called
HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny) that self-discipline can never work
because of the inevitable conflict of interest one encounters in applying
disciplinary constraints to oneself. This same organization repeatedly
questions the whole concept of professionalism among attorneys, and
advocates the destruction of "the myth that lawyers are anything other
than business people delivering a service." It seems to the writer that
the greatest fan of the position taken by HALT has been the United
States Supreme Court. In a series of cases beginning with In re Griffiths'4
and ending with Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,5 the Supreme
Court of the United States has made it perfectly clear that there is no
such thing as a "learned profession" exemption from the Sherman
Antitrust Act or the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
It may be helpful to contrast some of the duties and responsibilities
of a lawyer who considers himself a member of a learned profession,
12. 1988 La. Acts No. 442.
13. Act 442 introduced new sanctions for improper use of the judicial process, and
in that way closely parallels Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, known in practitioner's jargon as "rule
eleven."
14. 413 U.S. 717, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973).
15. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988). The court's position was developed in the interim by
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975); Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); and Zauderer v. Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
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and thereby bound by a code of ethics, with those of a lawyer who
considers himself simply a tradesman. The lawyer who considers himself
a professional exhibits these attributes:
His primary goal is public service through the promotion
of an efficient system of justice.
He observes a ban on competition that includes no fee
cutting, no advertising, and no direct solicitation.
He respects and carries out his duty to represent indigents
without compensation.
He considers pro bono work an obligation.
He charges only reasonable fees.
He owes a fiduciary duty to his clients and considers the
relationship between himself and his client to be personal, unique,
and fiduciary.
He is familiar with and attempts to abide by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
He acknowledges that his constitutional rights may some-
times be limited by his oath as an attorney at law.
He attends continuing legal education seminars not because
such attendance is mandatory, but because he regards it as his
duty to continue to be competent.
He protects the confidentiality of all matters relating to the
representation of his client.
He is candid and respectful to the court and fair to all
others.
He believes that duty to his client or duty to the system of
justice are interrelated, and that service to the one serves the
other.
Now let us consider the lawyer who is simply a tradesman:
He may engage in any lawful type of competition, which
would include cutting fees, advertising, and direct solicitation
of business.
He may charge what the market will bear.
He cannot be forced to work for nothing.
He owes no one pro bono services.
He does not acknowledge that he is a member of any special
class subject to any special privileges, nor does he acknowledge
that he is subject to any special rules or supervision.
He vigorously claims every constitutional right that anyone
[Vol. 49
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
else has.
He regards competence as a competitive advantage pursued
for economic benefit.
His relationship with his clients is not necessarily personal,
nor is it unique in any sense, and it is fiduciary only to the
extent required by the laws of the state.
Confidentiality is governed only by the evidentiary privilege.
He owes no duty of candor to the court or fairness to
others, and he does not recognize any rules of etiquette either
toward his brother lawyers or toward court officials.
He considers "officer of the court" to be an empty title.
No matter what the Louisiana State Bar Association does with self-
regulation or discipline, it is not going to bridge the chasm between
these two very different attitudes. It is futile therefore to say, as so
many bar officials do, that more and better regulation is necessary. All
one has to do to disabuse himself of the idea that more efficient
disciplinary regulation would make our troubles go away is to review
what has been the subject of discipline over the years since the Clark
report in 1970. The vast majority of cases in which serious sanctions
were imposed involved either convictions for serious offenses or findings
of manifest dishonesty (commingling, embezzlement, or outright theft).
Matters such as overcharging, representing conflicting interests, violations
of confidentiality, abuse of judicial procedures, and lack of candor to
the tribunal usually have been decided by the courts in specific cases,
and if there has been any follow-up in the disciplinary process, it has
not reached the public stage except in isolated instances.
But it is here where so many problems lie. Many attorneys see
nothing ethically wrong with misusing the system of justice as long as
it is advantageous to their clients or as long as it is profitable to them.
The courts are taking corrective measures, but such steps should not
be necessary. In a recent law review article, Professor L. Ray Patterson
discusses a 1986 Georgia Supreme Court decision that created new tort-
abusive litigation.' 6 Legal procedure should be a vehicle to early deter-
mination of real disputes. Using procedural devices to prevent that early
determination perverts the adversary system. Such abuse of the system
has led some to conclude that the adversary ethic itself is unsound, 7 a
view which the writer does not share. It must give pause to consider,
16. Patterson, Yost v. Torok: Taking Legal Ethics Seriously, 4 Ga. St. U.L. Rev.
23 (1988).
17. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethics, 41 Vand. L. Rev.
697 (1988).
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however, that professional standards are maintained by compulsive rather
than voluntary adherence to the Model Rules. Perhaps this is why the
federal court in Dallas feels that it is necessary to do more than simply
adopt by rule of court the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Obviously Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 11 was designed to force compliance with what
are now Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the Model Rules. Although this
writer certainly has not conducted a survey, he would suspect that lawyers
are much more apt to pay attention to and follow the admonitions of
Rule 11 than the admonitions of Rules 3.1 and following.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion in Shapero, said:
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other oc-
cupations that may be equally respectable, is that membership
entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of
economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could
not be enforced either by legal fiat or though the discipline of
the market. 8
As this statement demonstrates, Justice O'Connor recognizes that ad-
herence to ethical rules cannot really be enforced unless the vast majority
of lawyers and judges adhere to them as a matter of conscience. In
Louisiana this insight brings us squarely up against the integrated bar
association. Every lawyer, in order to practice in Louisiana, must belong
to the Louisiana State Bar Association. However, that association, as
an arm of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, simply cannot impose
regulations on its members that are more restrictive than those the
Supreme Court of the United States will allow. But what about a
voluntary association of Louisiana lawyers? Certain trial lawyer asso-
ciations in the United States have adopted sets of ethical rules for their
members. To some extent, this is what the Dallas Bar Association is
doing.
Lawyers who believe that adherence to traditional ethics enhances
the system of justice, aids the public in general, and gives them a higher
quality of life could form their own association and open their mem-
bership to all who share the same dedication to professionalism and are
willing to give up some of their "rights" in order to present a united
front. Of course, such an effort might be immediately labeled elitist,
and the organization branded as a guild. But if a guild is dedicated to
serving the public through a more efficient system of justice, what ground
is there for complaint?
Some commentators have contended that the whole problem lies in
lack of training in the law schools. If what they mean is that these
18. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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schools have failed to teach the Code or the Rules, their charge simply
does not hold water. What we have been teaching in law schools are
the ethical rules adopted by the supreme court of our state as limited
by the rulings of the United States Supreme Court. We do not teach
"ethics," properly defined as "standards of right and wrong that pre-
scribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations,
benefits to society, fairness or specific virtues." 1 9 Much of what appears
in our Model Rules simply is not "ethics" at all, but is more akin to
etiquette. 20 The old ban on fee cutting, advertising, and solicitation fall
into this category. Thus, the problem is not that' students are not taught
that the profession they seek to embrace is dedicated to public service;
rather, it is that students simply do not see such dedication in the other
members of their profession when they begin to practice. The real
economic peer pressure brought to bear on those entering our profession
tends to produce a business-as-usual attitude. 21
CONCLUSION
From all of these musings can we arrive at any conclusions that
might be helpful to us as lawyers, to the more efficient working of the
system of justice, and to the public in general? Mr. Ronald D. Rotunda,
in an article entitled "The Word 'Profession' is Only a Label-And
Not a Very Useful One,"' 22 argues that the professional qualities of
dedication to serving client interests-of rendering a service beyond self-
interest, of duty, of a spirit of public service-are attributes of indi-
viduals, not of occupations. Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that there
is no consensus in the legal profession in connection with standards of
conduct that are proposed by bar associations. Perhaps we should also
recognize that there is a national trend away from any one set of moral
or ethical standards. What, then, should we do?
While admitting that there is no clear cut answer to this question,
this writer offers the following proposals. First, the law schools should
revamp their approach to the teaching of professional ethics. As a first
step in this direction, each law professor should teach ethics in the
broad sense as an integral part of his course. This is in essence the
approach that Thomas Schaffer takes in his text on legal ethics.2 3 The
course in professional responsibility, which should be taught in the senior
year, should in large part be devoted to an historical review of the
19. 1 Issues in Ethics 2 (Oct. 1987).
20. Drinker, Legal Ethics 211, n.3 (1953).
21. Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 741 (1988).
22. Rotunda, 4 Learning & L. 16 (Summer 1977).
23. American Legal Ethics: Text, Reading and Discussion Topics (Matthew Bender,
1985).
19881
494 LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 49
various codes of ethics to demonstrate why we have such a code and
how it is supposed to work. The remainder of the course should be
dedicated to what is, in fact, a far less important subject, namely,
mastery of the mechanical rules, which we should somewhat loosely
refer to as the "Code of Ethics." As all lawyers know, this Code of
Ethics, whether it be the Model Rules or the Model Code, simply does
not have answers to the truly difficult questions facing lawyers. These
answers can only be reached by the individual lawyer after serious
reflection upon what he has been taught by his parents, his church, his
teachers, and his law professors.
Second, a change of attitude must also be stressed by law professors
and the courts. Trite though it may seem, lawyers must be expected to
advance the system of justice, which inevitably will be beneficial to the
clients, even at the expense of the lawyer's own economic welfare.
